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Discussion After the Speeches of Richard L. Jarashow
and A. H. E. Popp*
QUESTION, Professor King: What are the chances of the U.S.
eventually accepting a Canadian-type scheme for oil pollution liability?
ANSWER, Mr. Jarashow: I certainly think that it's a possibility.
One of the barriers is the concept of non-preemption of state law. The
fundamental problem of the legal regime in the United States is that the
states layer, on top of a federal regime, a body of law, which essentially
handcuffs the federal government, preventing it from doing anything but
a small range of limiting factors in the area of oil pollution liability and
remuneration.
The idea of a top-up scheme might work, but it would have to be
attached to the concept of the shipowner being able to fall within the
international regime of limited liability. Until that concept is bought in
the United States, I don't think that there is even compatibility between
the two schemes.
QUESTION, Ms. Dallmeyer: Is the International Convention limited to effects within the territorial seas of signatories?
ANSWER, Mr. Popp: The way it works is that it doesn't matter
where the spill is. If the spill is on the high seas, but spreads into the
territorial seas, then it is covered. If it doesn't spread into territorial seas,
then it's not covered.
One of the hard compromises at the 1984 conference was to extend
the application of the Convention out to 200 miles. If there is a spill
beyond that, then it is not covered. In that regard, in current negotiations for the adoption of a new convention, a suggestion has been made, I
think by our Australian friends, that the new convention should apply to
the high seas. Others have said that poses quite a few problems, because
who really has jurisdiction out there?
QUESTION, Ms. Dallmeyer: Is the $500 million cap set by the P &
I Clubs essentially a private decision? Is there nothing to keep the P & I
Clubs from reducing the coverage that they're willing to extend?
ANSWER, Mr. Jarashow: You have to understand a little bit more
about the P & I or protection and indemnity concept to understand why
that is probably not going to happen. The real problem is not sufficient
reinsurance capacity to raise the $500 million cap. There was, until last
year, $700 million available through primary and excess reinsurance.
* The questions and answers presented herein have been edited by the Canada-UnitedStates
Law Journal for the purpose of clarity, and have not been edited or reviewed by the respective
speakers.
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Principally, because of the effects of oil pollution liability in the
United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Exxon Valdez, insurance capacity shrunk from $700 million to $500 million, and people
were really quite surprised that $500 million could be achieved.
It is a matter of consent that the insurance companies will extend as
much reinsurance capacity as is available. Because P & I coverage is
really a shipowners' group created by the shipowners in their own self
interest, the likelihood is that they're going to continue to insure for the
maximum amount of available reinsurance.
QUESTION, Ms. Dallmeyer: What would have been the difference
in the liability faced by Exxon had the U.S. adopted the International
Convention, as opposed to the laws existing at the time?
ANSWER, Mr. Jarashow: Assuming that limitation of liability
would have been permitted under the international regime, the maximum
coverage available under the 1984 protocols was US $260 million. Rumors abound that Exxon has paid upwards of $2 billion for settling cases
under that particular oil spill.
QUESTION, ProfessorKing: What is the likelihood of the compensation protocols coming into force without U.S. participation?
ANSWER, Mr. Popp: There are international efforts underway
now to develop a few new protocols which would reproduce the sections
of the 1984 protocols, but which would make significant changes to the
entry into force provisions, so as to make it possible for the substance of
the 1984 protocols to come into force without U.S. participation. In
other words, the international community, principally the Europeans
and a few others, are determined to bring those protocols into force without U.S. participation, because we need the change in the system: notably, the substantial increase in compensation.
QUESTION, Ms. Dallmeyer: Does the international regime still
preserve the sanctity of the cargo as being isolated from liability?
ANSWER, Mr. Popp: In the strict sense you're correct; there is no
direct liability of the cargo under the scheme. However, the argument
goes, of course, that cargo contributes to compensation through the
mechanism of the International Fund. It is thought this is a more appropriate way of channeling the participation of the cargo interest.
QUESTION, Mr. Luneberg: Does the International Convention include natural resource damage provisions?
ANSWER, Mr. Popp: The definition of "pollution damage" in the
1969 Civil Liability Convention, which also, incidentally, governs the
1971 Fund Convention, is very open-ended. It basically speaks of, I
think, contamination, and then leaves it to national courts to interpret
what this definition includes. This was okay until the Fund Convention
came into force, and then it was suddenly realized that such could result
in unequal treatment of the notion of pollution damage, depending on the
court to which you go. It could be broadly interpreted in one country to
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include natural resource damage, but a more conservative view might be
taken in another country.
This resulted in the IOPC Fund adopting guidelines as to what it
would recognize under this heading. I can't tell you from the U.S. point
of view, but certainly from a Canadian point of view, the Fund actually
went further in recognizing environmental resource damages than conventional Canadian law would go. In other words, for example, it recognized the right of compensation of hotel owners, fishermen or anyone
who can show economic damage directly resulting from the spill. However, there was still the fear, especially of the United States, that there
needed to be some consensus or uniformity among the contributing countries. So, the IOPC adopted guidelines which were then taken up into
the new definition that you find in the 1984 protocol, which recognizes
damage to the environment as a specific head, but attempts to restrict it
to costs of restoration. This is an effort to put some lid on it, and I can
tell you that is a fairly explosive subject within the international scheme.
QUESTION, Ms. Jensen: Will there be continued pressure due to
importation of oil that would perhaps lead to opening up places like
Anwar, the Alaska wilderness preserve, to oil exploration?
ANSWER, Mr. Jarashow: I think it's quite obvious that with the
emphasis on or the de-emphasis in international shipping, in the sense
that vessels will not call on the United States by virtue of the new oil
regime, and assuming that situation gets worse and not better, I obviously would foresee the possibility of a growing need to develop domestic
resources and also domestic fleets.

